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foreign and domestic licensing and distribution, intellectual property, product
development and technology transfer, foreign trade, and other related matters.
Jand is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin. She studied international
and comparative law at the Pontifica Universidade Catolica in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, and received her law degree from Cleveland Marshall College. She
gained international legal experience working in Brazil. Her experience is
something from which we all can benefit, as she has lectured and written for
diverse groups throughout the region.
I.

SUCCESSFULLY FINANCING OPERATIONS AND PROJECTS

A.
MODERATOR -

Recent Developments in Project Financing
JANA SIGARS:

Two components of international business and trade are trade and
investments. Investment, which involves the development and financing of
large infrastructure projects, is the cement that binds different countries'
interests to each other. It can be more powerful than conventional politics,
and in fact, it can motivate the political system to operate to the economic
advantage of all.
My political friends tell me that one of the first lessons of politics,
whether international or domestic, is to follow the money. That rule sets the
format for many relationships. Clearly, project financing in an enabling
investment environment is the engine that drives the future. Governments in
Latin America are making improvements in their infrastructures that will cost
billions of dollars. However, this time the bureaucracies are in the passenger
seat, and the private companies are at the wheel. To the extent that we can
create an investment environment in which international financing can
flourish, such infrastructure projects, among others, can be completed. This
will allow us to continue to enhance the growth of their economies and
hopefully, free trade. As countries invest more in each others' business
activities, the relationships between their political systems will grow.
We will begin with the heart and soul of international business, that is,
the financing component. The panelist to speak on recent developments in
project financing is Raul Herrera, General Counsel of the InterAmerican
Investment Corp. of Washington, D.C. Mr. Herrera serves as a member of
the senior management of the InterAmerican Investment Corporation (IIC).
He sits on its credit, finance, portfolio supervision, and management
committees. He leads a five-lawyer staff. Mr. Herrera hires external
counsel, as well as domestic counsel, to assist the IIC. He has been involved
in a transactional practice for over fourteen years, eight of which have been
at the IIC. He is a graduate of George Washington University School of
Law, where he also earned a B.A. in international relations with a focus on
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Latin America. He speaks regularly at international symposia and has
published numerous articles on the subject of international project financing.
Andrew J. Markus is be the second panelist. Josh is a shareholder of the
Miami office of Popham, Haik, Schnobrich & Kaufman. He concentrates his
practice in the areas of international and domestic business transactions,
finance, and counseling. He is in charge of the Latin American business
group of the firm. He has an incredible background of knowledge and
experience and represents both U.S. and non-U.S. corporations in forming
joint business ventures and project financing.
Josh was chairman of The Florida Bar International Law Section and the
ABA Membership Committee, and sits on the section's Advisory Committee
on Latin American Technical Assistance Project. He is a graduate of Duke
University and obtained his J.D. from the University of Florida.
1. The InterAmerican Investment Corporation
RAuL

R. HERRERA:

The IIC is a member of the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB)
Group. The IDB Group is composed of the Bank, the HC, and the
Multilateral Investment Fund. The HC was created under IDB Group
auspices with its operations commencing in the fall of 1989. We pursue our
investment strategy through two modes of activity. The first is direct
financing for projects through merchant banking operations, and the second
is indirectly through the financial sector or capital markets transactions.
From a financing perspective, the most important recent development in
Latin America and the Caribbean has been the end of the capital flight crisis.
The end of the debt crisis was heralded three to four years ago, and today,
we see the end of the flight crisis. Latin America itself is the region that
probably has the greatest amount of money nestled away and available for
investment in the region. We are seeing many Latin Americans redirecting
funds back into the region, demonstrating the confidence in their own
markets. Issuers from the region are increasing the volume of placements,
as foreign investors show an interest in the renewed stability and economic
growth in the region. International support, particularly from the multilaterals including the IIC, is another sign of increased confidence and
awareness of the interconnectedness of events in an emerging market.
Despite the private sector fallout due to the Mexican crisis in December,
1994, that is, the so-called "Tequila Effect," capital flows to emerging
markets in 1995 remain unchanged with respect to 1994 figures. Total flows
actually increased if we include the emergency lending to Mexico and
Argentina of about US$20 billion. The Institute of International Finance
reports that 1995 levels should actually meet the 1993 peak levels of US$215
billion, which includes borrowing in Latin America of about US$18 billion
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2
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for bond financing. In the region, the economic weakness experienced in the
first half of 1995 was reversed in the second half. As investor confidence
returns, investors differentiate amongst borrowers and more precisely
determine risks. Borrowers in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico have had to
pay higher spreads due to the perceived risks. The most attractive investment
opportunities in 1996 will be found in economies with strong potential for
growth in gross domestic product (GDP), which in addition to other factors,
will lead to open market reforms and an aggressive export orientation.
Reflecting renewed confidence in the region, capital flows to the
region are expected to increase by at least as much, if not more than the
previous year. The flows are estimated to be about US$52 billion in 1996,
up from US$37 billion in 1995. There is a moderate recovery in international issues in Latin America, largely due to the backlog of the Mexican
transactions that were not launched in 1995. This growth will not represent
a significant development, however, because there were less than twelve
issues, and they were mostly from Brazil.
From our perspective, two basic themes drive domestic equity markets.
One is the accelerating drive toward privatization and the emergence of
investment funds in the region. Secondly, on the debt side, debt financing
will rebound in 1996 as investors gain confidence in the region and in
alternative financing structures that go beyond the U.S. dollar-denominated
Eurobond offerings.
In Latin America, there are three areas emerging with respect to debt
financing in 1996: asset-backed securitization, diversification of borrowing
from Euromarkets, and the reemergence of syndicated loan markets for Latin
America. Asset-backed securitization financing for Latin America doubled
in 1995 as investors sought higher yields but were sensitive to the credit
risks, therefore requiring some sort of asset collateral.
The second area is created by the shift in financing from dollars to yen
and deutsche marks. German and Japanese investors are increasingly
attracted to Latin American issues by higher yields and the ability to
denominate those issues in their own currencies. Following the end of
commercial bank lending to the region in 1995, the syndicated loan market
for Latin American borrowers continued to expand in 1996, as an alternative
to international capital market transactions. Despite the publicity on the
Eurobond market, from 1994 to 1995 the global syndicated market has
outpaced bond activity as investors have shied away from Latin American
credits because of the Mexican crisis. The areas that will continue to reach
and utilize international debt financing will be those that are export-oriented
with relatively stable currencies in Argentina, Chile, and Columbia.
The IIC's Charter mandates that projects must be commercially viable.
The companies in which it invests must be majority-owned by nationals of
Latin America or the Caribbean. At our annual meeting in Israel in April
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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1995, that requirement was modified so that under limited circumstances, the
IIC can finance companies when the majority ownership is not Latin
American. Although the IIC shares a common directorship, its resources and
management are separate from the InterAmerican Development Bank. The
IIC Charter mandates that the IIC complement the activities of the IDB,
which has a new emphasis on structural change and enabling the environment
for the private sector in the region. In that respect, our role, although in a
smaller segment of the market, is similar to the International Finance
Corporation of the World Bank. We have US$200 million paid-in equity
capital. At our shareholders' meeting in Israel, the Board of Governors
agreed to increase our debt-to-equity leverage threefold, thereby providing
about US$800 million in financing. The IIC's debt financing are for up to
twelve years, and its equity investments are in place until its presence is
deemed to be no longer required. For a new enterprise, the IIC can finance
up to 33% of project costs, and for an expansion, it can provide up to 50%
of the capital costs of the expansion, provided that the financing is not
greater than 33% of the value of project assets. The total IC exposure to
any one project is US$10 million. The average financing is US$4 to US$6
million.
Our role as investor is to deal directly with project sponsors as the
director investor meeting the needs of the clients. Typical forms of direct
financial support include loans, equity investments, quasi-equity instruments,
equity and joint partner searches, and resource mobilization activities. The
impact of IIC financing in a project is substantial and far exceeds the level
of its direct participation. The IIC brings additional investors into transactions. When the IIC considers an investment, it looks at not only the project,
but also at the capital markets and the financial instruments in that country.
We always seek to take the markets a little deeper or to introduce different
instruments.
This was the case in Nicaragua where in 1991, the IIC invested seed
capital in Banco Mercantil, the first private commercial bank to be chartered
in Nicaragua after the banking system was nationalized in 1979. The HC's
involvement as a creditor for a US$2 million loan and an equity investment
of US$1 million in this de novo institution was critical because of the
confidence that it demonstrated in the institution and in the country,
notwithstanding the risks. This included political, foreign exchange rate,
deposit, and growth risks, in addition to the human resources factor, as
Nicaragua was beginning to return to the international fold in the financial
sector. Concerning the debt financing to the bank, the IIC finances the bank,
which in turn uses the funds to reach a target market, smaller than would be
reached out of Washington. The average loan size is about US$300,000,
primarily for productive sector investments for fixed assets and permanent
working capital. To mitigate the risks and as a condition for disbursements,
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2
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we established prudential banking regulations to which the bank must adhere
in light of the nascent superintendency of banks, which was just coming into
being. It is very interesting to go through U.S. banking regulations and put
together contractually prudential banking orders, loans to one borrower,
sectorial investments, capital requirements, and so forth. Over the last few
years, as the superintendency and its enforcement capability have come into
to their own, we have modified and reduced the banking notices to which the
bank was subject.
The HC structured the transactions so that when the bank made any loans
with our funds, it was required to assign to us all the underlying collateral
that was given to it for the debt financing. This was done so that, in the
event of default, we could collect directly from the borrower. In countries
where the regulatory framework is well-developed, the IIC may seek to enter
into transactions that support and promote the development of capital markets
in which both debt and equity instruments are issued and traded as a means
of helping the IIC's target market - private small- and medium-sized
companies - to mobilize funds. The IIC has expanded access to capital
markets through the use of local underwriting lines, as in Panama and
Argentina where it financed local institutions which in turn purchased issues
of small- and medium-sized companies, which traditionally have had
extremely limited access to these types of funding. Generally, the transaction
is structured so that the bank, with HC financing, must sell the paper within
six months, place that paper within six months, or take it for its own account.
Then it recycles the funds. The IIC also has done leasing lines. Again with
the new leasing law, which is an attractive incentive, the IIC put a credit line
for leasing transactions in place in Panama, and in Brazil.
There are three areas where the IIC has undertaken financing, which has
an interesting structure. In Guatemala in 1993, the IIC made a US$4.2
million loan to finance a fourteen-story, four-star, all-suite hotel, the Quality
Suites Hotel. It was the first of its kind to be built in Guatemala. Tourism
was deemed to be its most dynamic industry and the second largest generator
of foreign exchange after coffee. As part of that US$14.5 million financing,
of which the IIC provided US$4.2 million, our investment was deemed to be
a credit enhancer. The local investment bank wanted to place this paper on
the market so it did something that was very interesting. It issued a US$2
million offering with a six-month redeemable on the paper. At the expiration
of six months, it then offered the investors the opportunity to convert them
into a preferred position with an attractive rate for the'duration.
We identified two major risks. Foreign exchange earnings and cost
overruns, which are prevalent in hotel financing. For the cost overruns, we
established an offshore escrow account to capture hard currency payments for
our debt services and then took the standard security positions on the hotel.
All the operating agreements, that is, leases, construction, and management,
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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were assigned to the corporation. With regards to the overrun risk and
delays, we required the engagement of an independent consultant to review
and monitor disbursements on the project; took a project completion from the
individual sponsors to infuse funds if we deemed it necessary to finish the
project; brought in and supported an affiliation with Choice International
Hotels for its marketing network and reservations; and then brought in an
experienced operator. We negotiated an agreement with the operator, stating
that fees would be paid after the debt service was paid. In that way, we
encouraged the hotel operator to maintain the occupancy levels deemed
necessary for the debt service.
That same year, in Argentina, an economy with very active capital
markets, the IIC again found a very interesting niche. We provided a US$3
million and a US$1 million equity investment in Banco Mayorista. It was
the first private sector, second-tier banking institution in Argentina to
promote the development of the cooperative banking system. This de novo
bank's shareholders, including the IIC, comprised the entire cooperative
banking system. There were twenty-two cooperative banks, each with a
market niche and a sound portfolio. There are less today, as a result of the
fall-out over the last eighteen months. However, because of their specific
niche, each bank had inherent limitations on growth and financing potentials.
Therefore, along with some of the key players in these cooperative banks, the
IIC structured the second-tier institution, based in Buenos Aires, which with
cross-guarantees from each of the twenty-two cooperative banks, was able to
seek borrowing at lower cost, having had that critical mass of the twenty-two
cooperative banks. It represents an opportunity that had not yet been taken,
and in fact, today the bank is seeking to acquire another financial institution's
assets.
Board approval for the transaction that I am going to discuss next has not
been obtained. This transaction involves an agriculture and cogeneration
power project. The HC plans to put in about US$4 million of financing,
US$1 million in senior debt, and US$3 million of quasi-equity or convertible
debt. The agriculture component involves sugarcane and molasses production
with its related infrastructure, such as irrigation and drainage. It will be
about a US$14 million project. It is in a Central American economy, and
therefore it is considered medium-sized. The power side of the project is a
co-generation hydro project, with an interesting use of renewable sources of
energy from sugarcane, gas, and woodchips, which lower the energy
production costs. These components also will have a power purchase
agreement with the local utility, thereby guaranteeing a portion of our debt
service, again as a risk mitigator.
In addition to the standard risks, such as foreign exchange, volatile
commodity prices and local utility risks, there were several other project risks
that we identified. One involved land ownership; the land on which the
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2
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agriculture component would be built is not owned, but leased. Another risk
concerned water-rights, which is an area that has not been fully regulated and
needs to be put in place. We sought to set up a structure having separate
corporate entities by isolating the power operator, the power equipment
manufacturer, which would lease to the power generator, and the agricultural
component and then take assignment of the water concession rights and all
the operable agreements. It is a risky project. The returns, aggressively, are
projected to be about 30% with a very strong development component for
our purposes as a multilateral institution.
There are six, some or all of them, development criteria that we seek to
obtain in our investments. Initially, the IIC took a cautious position in
financing venture capital funds in order to enhance equity financing in the
region. However, now we take a more aggressive position. The HC looks
at direct equity funds, making direct equity positions with minority positions.
The IIC has three objectives in venture funds: (1) leveraging private
capital in order to reach the IIC's target market while maximizing returns; (2)
scarce equity resources to small- and medium-sized companies in the region;
and (3) participating directly in specific strategic sectors of an economy.
The HC has an investment fund with Fondelec, an energy group, with a
focus on acquiring energy investments, and they have concluded energy
investments in Peru and in Bolivia. One criterion for investing these funds
is a divestment after ten years, with one or two years of orderly liquidation.
The IC requires the on-site presence of an established, seasoned, local fund
manager, ideally with private equity investment experience. Not someone
who is a former banker or capital markets investor, but rather someone who
knows the private equity markets in a particular country. An important factor
in these investments is the potential of the sponsors to raise funds or to
commit investors early on to pick up the momentum.
The involvement of the IIC as a foreign investor is critical in fundraising,
and we consider it opportune to influence the target market of the funds as
well as to focus on the environmental matters of their investments. It often
takes a position on the investment committee or advisory committee.
In Central America, the IIC is launching a Central American investment
fund. It will provide investments in that region. We view it as an
opportunity to provide scarce equity financing with generally comparable
high returns. It is interesting to note that in this area they are establishing
funds on a more aggressive basis.
Previously, when there were only two or three Latin American venture
funds, the IIC conceived of the Latin American Development Capital
Program, a two-tier or double-decker regional investment program which
targets investments in nonlisted equity participation in the region and was
cosponsored with Advent International of Boston. The first tier and
cornerstone of the program is the HC's equity investment in the regional
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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Latin American Private Equity Fund. This fund has a US$200 million target
capitalization and had its first closing of US$80 million from institutional
investors in the United States, Canada, and Europe.
The second tier of the program is made up of four country funds: Grupo
Bozano Simonsen in Brazil, Banco de Santiago in Chile, Grupo Financiero
Probursa in Mexico, and Banco de Galicia in Argentina. Each of these
institutions cosponsors the program through their own equity investments as
well and taking on the role of fund manager. A regional fund can catalyze
international funds into the country funds or into specific investments in the
countries.
In addition, the IIC's involvement in the financial sector goes beyond
traditional intermediation. In Bolivia, the IC invested US$1.3 million in
BancoSol. Within the first year it was turning a profit. BancoSol's target
market average loan is about US$300 and provides financial services to over
50,000 microentrepreneurs.
A novel investment that we made in 1995 was a US$2.5 million equity
investment in a pension fund administrator. Peru has modified its pension
fund laws, providing for a private system. There the IC saw an opportunity
to play a catalytic role in deepening the capital markets. As the pension
administrator seeks to find instruments to invest the resources which it
manages, it will, in effect, drive the market to provide such instruments, as
well as finance privatizations of parastetal entities and encourage domestic
savings. The IC approved that transaction at the end of 1995. It is about
to close, and there is a large international bank that now is seeking to make
an equity investment as well.
The last area that I will discuss is cofinancing. With a US$200 million
capital base and US$800 million financing capacity, our relevance and
significance rest in the extent to which we can catalyze and mobilize
additional funds into Latin America. It is a very broad mandate, and since
initiating its cofinancing activities in 1991 with Banca Serfin, S.A., in
Mexico, the IC has brought in Japanese and European banks. The Serfin
cofinancing transaction represented the first long-term, voluntary lending for
European and Japanese commercial banks to Mexico after the nationalization
of banks in 1982. Three of the five banks had taken significant hits after that
nationalization, but through our co-financing structure. The IIC agreed to
lend US$22 million to Banca Serfin.
The structure is as follows: the IIC structures a loan to the borrower,
which then has two parts: the A-loan, which is for the IC's account, and the
B-loan, which is funded by commercial banks participating in the IIC credit
and ranks paripassel with the IC portion. The IIC is the lender of record.
It administers the credit and handles the servicing, when and if the borrower
pays. It is a nonrecourse both ways from the borrower to the IC or from a
participant to the IIC. This is a common mode the IFC has used for the past
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2
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25 to 30 years. As a regionally specialized institution, the HC is recognized
as having a commercial familiarity with the environment, the institutions, and
in identifying promising investments.
By its very nature, the IIC has three characteristics that uniquely position
it to undertake projects which private international financial institutions may
not consider attractive: its Charter-mandated immunities and privileges in
each of its member countries, affiliation with the IDB, and investment
horizon. Based upon the Agreement Establishing the Inter-American
Investment Corporation, an international treaty, the HC granted immunities
from expropriation, moratoria and taxation with regard to its assets and
operations in member countries. In addition, the IIC's advance notification
to the host government of an activity that the IIC intends to undertake serves
to confirm that the host government has no objection to the proposed
financing of the project. The IDB's decades of experience in regional
development, strong research and economic analyses, as well as it network
of offices in each country of the region, have proven invaluable for the HC
and has permitted strategies in developing the private sector of the region.
It is not surprising that the HC has mobilized funds in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Columbia, Peru, Uruguay, and Mexico. The funding is primarily
European and Japanese. The HC has done co-financing for financial
institutions. We have raised US$60 million for one bank in Argentina. We
also have done co-financing for projects. For example, the IIC identified a
project in downtown Montevideo, Uruguay, where there was a need for a
We then made a
cost-efficient and effective transportation system.
US$300,000 equity investment and an US$11.1 million loan, of which we
would finance US$4.4 million and raise US$6.6 million on the international
markets. This was not an oil or a gas deal in Argentina but a bus transportation project in Uruguay; traditionally, a sector reserved for the government
and with some inherent limitations structurally, due to concessions and other
factors. The transaction was structured with 9 principle bus operators, in
addition to the IIC who would operate about 130 buses on a peak basis and
service approximately 16 million passengers.
The IIC identified several risks. One was the lack of foreign exchange
generated. They were charging local fees, and we were making a dollardenominated credit. We mitigated that with the existing free convertibility
structure that exists in Uruguay by requiring that the operators set up an offshore sinking fund in which the company could convert local currency to
dollars and over-collateralize the account with hard currency.
Another risk was the fifty-year concession granted by the government to
the operator to maintain this passenger and small-cargo transport service.
Again, eighty-five percent of the bus operators in that market were
shareholders in the company. Each of them pledged their shares to us. In
none of these instances am I suggesting that the risks can be eliminated,
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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however, they can be mitigated and reduced to a comfortable level vis-A-vis
our development objectives as well as the potential returns.
Lastly, there was an issue of hard guarantees on fixed assets, which had
been prohibited under the government concession. We took an assignment
of the space leasing, since the terminal was a multi-use operation. We raised
the US$6.6 million from international commercial banks. The terminal is
operational, and the company is now planning to do a private placement in
the near future. Obviously, our investment serves as a credit enhancer.
The IIC's financial advisory services can be divided into two broad
categories: governmental and corporate. We act as a financial advisor to
governments either directly or indirectly through the IDB. It serves as a
consultant in the structuring and execution of privatization efforts. On the
corporate advisory side, the HC conducts private equity searches as well as
joint-partner and financial reengineering for companies. An interesting
project is as a principal advisor to the AIGGE Latin American infrastructure
fund. It is a closed-end, one-of-a-kind, billion-dollar fund that will have
penciled-in commitments from AIG and GE Capital of about US$100 million
each. The fund will take long-term, direct minority positions in privatelyfinanced Latin American infrastructure projects and to date, it is the largest
of its kind.
On a final note, it is particularly noteworthy that the IIC has achieved
these results while dedicating the majority of its resources to small- and
medium-sized businesses. Through careful selection of projects that promise
economic viability and a positive developmental impact, the IIC is able to
support Latin American and Caribbean efforts to achieve a balanced growth.
2.

Government Support and Risk Mitigation

ANDREW J. MARKUS:

I will be discussing mitigation of risks in project financing. A project is
like a watch. There is an inter-relationship among the pieces. There are an
incredible number of pieces in a watch that work together so that it runs
properly just as there are a large number of interests that have to be balanced
in any project. Rather than discussing mitigation of risk in terms of risk
assurance institutions, for example, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) insurance and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
insurance, I would like to discuss the role of the host government.
The host government's role is crucial for the mitigation of risks to the
lender, for the bankability of the project, and for ensuring the atmosphere
necessary to create the infrastructure of the infrastructure, as it were. The
host government must initially authorize the project. This generally requires
special governmental approvals and legislation. The tangible agreements of
the government are typically set up in some sort of documentation. For
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2

10

1996]

DOING BUSINESS IN LATIN AMERICA

Sigars: Successfully Financing Operations and Projects

instance, in a Build, Operate, and Transfer (BOT) Project, you typically have
a concession agreement, where the host government indicates exactly what
support it will provide and then grants a license or concession to make the
project run. Often, there is a government support agreement or an implementation agreement, which may be two parts of the same thing or may be part
of a concession agreement. The agreement essentially outlines the plans for
the project and nails down some of its crucial aspects so that you feel
protected. There are a number of reasons for the government to actively
support a project. Often a project will not be realized without this support.
In the late 1980s, the World Bank wrote that many BOT projects did not
come to fruition because the governments did not know how to support or
operate them. Governments have taken this point, and now BOT projects are
going forward.
The main reason for a government to support a project is political. It is
indispensable for the government to be squarely behind a project. In many
locations, such as Brazil, governments have stopped, started, and stopped
again privatizations because the political climate was not right for them to
come to fruition. Public sector support for the project must be formally
established, and the public and the bureaucracy brought on board.
Government support establishes what the government's contribution is going
to be to the project, and it provides assurance to lenders and sponsors in
regards to the political and regulatory environment in which the project is
going to be developed. Governments often give lenders contractual rights
aimed at shifting risks.
There are two types of government support: financial and nonfinancial.
The bottom line is that without government acceptance of some of the risks,
projects are not going to go forward. The government must be prepared to
accept some risks. The lenders are going to seek to mitigate their risks to the
maximum extent possible, and they are probably right. They will shift their
risks onto the sponsors, the development company, the operators, and to a
It is the
large extent for noncommercial risks, to the government.
government's objectives that are being served by financing many of these
projects, so they should be able and willing to carry some of the risks.
There are some circumstances in which government support is crucial.
For example, there are many up front costs incurred in complying with
project documents, preparing the bid, and having a team visit the project, do
some due diligence, and cost-out on the project. The government sometimes
may need to defray some of these costs. In addition, there are projects that
have a significant market risk. Without government support, people may not
want to take that risk. There may be uncertainty as to the direction of future
government policy; the government has to reassure investors and make sure
that everyone feels that everyone is rowing in the same direction.
Sometimes, there is greater political risk because you are in a less-developed
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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economy; the government should formally announce that it stands behind the
project. If there are international lenders in the project or if there is equity
capital being contributed, government support is crucial because of the
comfort factor. Finally, sometimes a project might be a new approach to
private sector development; the government should state its support for this
new type of development.
Governments can demonstrate support through legislation relating to a
project. Typically, the government first has to authorize the project. It has
to authorize the entity that is going to deal with the project and many times,
establish a regulatory environment and regulations for the project. If you
plan to do a mining project and do not have clear environmental regulations
to follow, you know you are taking a risk. Sometimes, you are willing to
take that risk; other times you want the path to be clearer. If you are going
into a regulated industry, for example, the electric industry, you want to
make sure that the regulators have clear duties and cannot arbitrarily hold
you up.
One contractual form of government support is a comfort letter, where
it feels constrained, politically or otherwise, to give you some kind of legally
binding agreement. It usually is not a guarantee, but it has moral force. It
is a written assurance of continued support for a project or interest in a
project, or assurance that a borrower is someone acceptable to deal with. A
comfort letter can be legally binding. However, usually it is not, and you
need to make sure of its language. Otherwise, although the letter may sound
good, in reality, it will not hold up. Maybe you are willing to take that risk.
Governments know that if they resist giving a contractual agreement, often
times, the project will not be bankable. Sometimes, however, it may be an
emerging-country fund that is willing to take a fair amount of risk, as
opposed to a lender who wants to be assured of repayment. Another type of
contractual agreement is a concession agreement, which is a very important
document. Typically, you have a government support agreement, and you
may have an implementation agreement. In a BOT project, the government's
support is generally in the concession agreement.
An implementation agreement sets up what the project company is going
to do. It gives the government the information about what the project
company is going to do in terms of investment. It can provide for a term for
the project, or under certain circumstances, it can provide for termination of
the project. It can then lead to a government support agreement. The
implementation agreement may state that the project company is going to
enter into a government support agreement (GSA).
There are again two types of support in the GSA itself. There is a
financial component and a nonfinancial component. From a financial
perspective you have both pre-project assurances and assurances that continue
throughout the operation of the project. When the costs of setting up a bid
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2
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are very high, the government says, "If you comply with our bidding
documents, but do not make it, we may defray part of your costs." That
makes it attractive for people to bid. But you must be qualified in order to
bid. Also, the government might say, "We have some difficult legislation
that must pass in order for the project to pass. We want to get this started
now. But in the event that we are unable to get the legislation passed, we
may defray your costs." The GSA also states in various terms what the
equity capital contribution of the government will be, what other financial
support may be available, like grants or subordinated loans, and what the
transfer of the assets to the project company will be so you can start to either
build or operate the project.
The clauses or provisions in a GSA depend upon the nature of each
project. There are many key things to look for:
(1) the maximum level the government can take from the project in
the form of taxes, royalties, and other levies and duties;
(2) the amounts of direct financial contributions to be made to the
project by the government;
(3) protection from competition, for example, you would not want to
go into a large-scale capital investment only to find that the
government has authorized three others just like it, and the length of
protection you are going to receive, if any;
(4) the right of the sponsor to export and sell products offshore and
keep foreign currency sales proceeds offshore;
(5) the availability, transferability, and convertibility of foreign
exchange and the exchange rate involved;
(6) nondiscrimination provisions, so that the government cannot pass
laws that affect foreign investors but not domestic industries;
(7) whether or not a change in legislation is anticipated;
(8) the passage of necessary legislation required for the implementation and development of the project;
(9) noninterference/intervention by any state organ in respect to the
project except where state action can be justified on major public
policy grounds;
(10) the ability to import plant and the equipment necessary for the
operation, repair, and maintenance of the project; and
(11) the required permits and approvals that the government is going
to issue.
The government might need to maintain support of your project. If you
were building a bridge, for instance, perhaps you would require the
government to maintain the roads that access the bridge. Explore the
possibility of a "tax holiday" for a certain number of years or a value added
tax exemption. Another important consideration is the inclusion of a step-in
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provision in the event of a default whereunder the lender can step in to
operate the project and save the concession. For example, if you were to
foreclose on a bridge, you would not be able to take the bridge back to your
own country and use it. Instead, you need the ability to substitute an
operator or a manager. Also, the project company should have the right to
take the proceeds of escrow accounts if they are in-country or if you have an
off-shore escrow account in order to limit financial risks. Those are the type
of things to look for in terms of financial assurance.
In terms of nonfinancial support, the things that you should look for
basically are linked to the bankability of the project. The government agrees
to behave in a particular way, and it recognizes the security rights of lenders.
Therefore, everyone knows the project has validity and can go forward.
Sometimes, the government will recognize and approve the financing.
Sometimes, it will guarantee the credit worthiness of the state-owned entities
with whom you are dealing. The government agrees not to expropriate the
project except in the case of some great necessity, in which case it assures
payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. If the license or
the concession were to be terminated, perhaps the government would agree
to give a substitute license to the new operator who steps in. The
government might give you advance notice of possible events of default and
an opportunity to effect a cure.
Perhaps, the government will recognize a remedy. For instance, U.K.
law allows a "floating charge." A floating charge carries with it the right to
have a receivor appointed for those assets. In most places in Latin America,
a receivor is unavailable. Perhaps the government would allow the choice
of law to appoint a receivor, consenting to the security that is created in the
assets. Sometimes it will subordinate its claim to a lender's claim. The
government also might waive sovereign immunity by the governmental
grantor and establish that their activities are commercial as opposed to
governmental. Many times the concession agreement establishes a dispute
resolution procedure. You should be inventive in a dispute resolution
provision. Escalate the negotiations to a certain level before getting into
Most project finance contracts call for
anything that is adversarial.
forum.
a
neutral
in
arbitration
It is important for project documents to provide for predictable law that
allows the lender's security interest to attach with as many rights as possible
in the event of default. Questions of choice of law and whether a court in
a particular jurisdiction will recognize a particular choice of law need to be
included. Most people choose U.K. or New York law for their project
documents because they are predictable. There is a whole body of case law
that supports them, but some governments, notably those of Argentina and
Mexico, may be adverse to using a New York choice of law. The concept
of "depecage" also is sometimes used to mitigate the choice of law dilemma.
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Depecage is the express choice of two different bodies of law to apply to the
same contract. It may be used alternatively. For instance, if the project is
in Mexico and the dispute arises in a Mexican court, one would use the law
of Mexico, but if the dispute arises in a New York court, New York law
would apply. Also, different laws could apply to different portions of a
contract.
Let me conclude by saying that government support is crucial, and it can
make or break a project. Government has to take some risks, and it has to
contribute to the relationship. It allows for predictability in the environment
within which the project occurs. It allows the project to run smoothly,
helping to ensure that the lenders will be repaid.
B.

The ProgramaBolivar of the InterAmerican Development Bank

MODERATOR -

JANA SIGARS:

I am very excited to introduce our next speaker, Susan Vodicka. We are
honored to have her at the conference. Susan is the President and Chief
Executive Officer for the Florida Partnership of the Americas, a not-for-profit
corporation dedicated to the implementation of the goals set forth in the
Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles and the furthering of
hemispheric economic integration. Under her leadership, since May of 1995,
the Florida Partnership has aggressively developed three primary projects,
including the Commercial Dispute Resolution Center of the Americas (CDR).
The CDR is dedicated to the use of arbitration and mediation as a costeffective means of resolving business, trade, and investment disputes in the
Americas.
The second project in which Susan was involved was the development
of the InterAmerican Development Bank's Bolivar Program Office, which
began operation in Miami, in March 1996. This project provides joint
venture opportunities and assistance to small- and medium-sized businesses
throughout the Western Hemisphere.
Her third project is the Business Network for Hemispheric Integration,
which focuses on private sector leadership in carrying out the Summit
mandate of a free-trade area by the year 2005. It currently is preparing
recommendations from the private sector to be presented in Cartagena,
Colombia at the Second Western Hemisphere Trade Ministerial Summit.
After she was appointed by Governor Lawton Chiles and Lieutenant
Governor Buddy McKay as Chief of Operations for the Summit of the
Americas 1994 Host Committee, Susan coordinated the local community and
the State of Florida. She also negotiated and coordinated the logistics with
the White House, the State Department, the Governor's office, and Miami
leaders. She worked with thirty-four heads of state, cabinet ministers,
ambassadors, dignitaries, and journalists from throughout the Western
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Hemisphere. A long-term resident of Miami, for over twenty-three years, she
has vast experience in the economic development programs.
SUSAN VODICKA:

The Florida Partnership of the Americas is a public/private partnership.
In a state as complex as Florida, this innovative approach to planning is a
necessity. We began with private sector funding. Contrary to some opinion,
we not only hosted the Summit of the Americas, but also successfully raised
money from the public and private sectors for that venture. We carefully
budgeted our operation and ended up with money in the bank, which is
almost impossible to comprehend for such a public event. We began with
private sector investment from very substantial corporate entities in our
communities and throughout the United States. We added public sector
funding from the state legislature, the governor's office and Metro-Dade
County through the support of the airport and the seaport. This is why we
are on track. We are relatively low profile. We are a lean operation with a
small board of directors and have a narrow focus. We are very specifically
targeted on the projects that Jan has referenced.
One of the projects that often comes up in discussions about international
economic development for the state of Florida is an IDB project, an OAS
project, and a commercial dispute resolution center. This project has been
near and dear to the hearts of creative people in this community for many
years. The IDB was interested in having a Miami presence but is prohibited
by their rules from establishing a branch office in a developed country.
Their headquarters are in Washington. The mission of the IDB is to build
and support the infrastructure of developing nations.
The Programa Bolivar was begun by the IDB almost three years ago in
Venezuela. They moved very quickly to establish offices in twenty nations
within the first two years. It is a simple process, actually, because with
today's computer technology and our ability to communicate, there is no
longer a need for a person who owns a small business in Iowa to travel to
Brazil, where she or he may not speak the language and has limited
knowledge of the cultural differences and the way business is done in Brazil
as compared to Iowa. People can be linked through a network. For a
relatively small fee, a small- to medium-sized company can access this
network of information.
Some of the projects that began during the last three years involve larger
companies, such as large real estate projects in some of the island nations.
However, the primary goal of this program was to provide a means for smalland medium-sized companies to become international. The opportunity arose
when twenty offices were established throughout the hemisphere to set up a
liaison office for the entire United States and a liaison office for Canada.
The office in Canada opened near the end of 1995, and the liaison office for
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2
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the entire United States will open up here in Miami in 1996. The Florida
Partnership took on this project because the community needed to
demonstrate its willingness to support this project.
The IDB could not invest its own money here. Primarily, the success of
the program in various capital cities in Central and South America and the
Caribbean has been due to the fact that the professional service providers,
such as lawyers, accountants, financial institutions, insurance companies,
manufacturers, and entrepreneurs, saw the value of supporting something like
this as a means of further integrating the hemisphere.
We have an opportunity, and we are not going to let it pass. Opening
an IDB office of the Bolivar Program in Miami will open the door for the
InterAmerican Investment Corporation and other projects. Because Miami
is such a perfect crossroads for meeting and planning in this hemisphere, we
anticipate a much higher profile for IDB planning sessions and projects in
our community. It is important to understand that this is a network of
networks. The IDB and the Bolivar Program have a wealth of information
that can be shared through our office by connecting into the International
Network of the Bolivar Program. This liaison office is a boon to the
professional service providers in our community and throughout the United
States. There is no doubt that if properly marketed as a gateway into the
markets, the potentially lucrative markets in Central and South America and
the islands will be very attractive to companies throughout the United States.
The most important of these networks is the so-called political and social
support network, formed by national commissions within each member
country. In the United States these commissions are composed of business
people, scientists, legislators, and other government officials. The Florida
Partnership for the Americas, however, will not play a role in this. The role
of the Florida Partnership is that of a catalyst for launching projects that are
substantive in the international economic development of this community.
This is an opportunity for the business people of Miami. While members of
this commission must come from throughout the United States, it is clearly
the intent of the IDB that South Florida be the focal point. One priority over
the first six months will be to develop the U.S. commission.
Another key network is the financial network or Financial League, which
was set up in 1993. Nearly 100 financial institutions throughout the region
are involved in this network, offering financing alternatives for Bolivar
Program deals. This is an ideal situation for financial institutions in Florida
and the international banking community in Miami. We can anticipate that
all financial institutions will have the opportunity to participate in this
network. It will not be exclusive in the same way as a commission.
Additional networks offer legal support and link academic institutions to
the business sector. We have had continuing conversations with the
university system in Florida, as well as with private colleges and universities
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in Florida. A natural link exists between our academic institutions, financial
institutions, and entrepreneurial community. This link is at play in Florida
in the innovative Enterprise Florida Program, which offers the potential for
Florida to serve as a leadership model on this type of project. Within this
network of the IDB project, there is plenty of opportunity for providers of
legal services to participate in the planning, development, and approval of
these joint venture projects, so that they are attractive to lending institutions.
Monies are going into the larger projects from the world lending institutions,
that is, the financial arm of the IDB. Program Bolivar initiates the necessary
mechanisms to distribute information on international bidding and provides
assistance on how to successfully access them. Once professional people
have participated with the entrepreneurs, the manufacturers involved, and
others who have had an opportunity to adjust the project to its highest
potential for success, then the project will become more attractive to venture
capital. This community will begin to understand this to be mutually
beneficial and that certainly will lend itself to the mission of integrating this
hemisphere.
Finally, more networks are being created for (1) training in international
business; (2) technical project formulation and the transfer of technology
between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean; (3)
harmonization of legislation governing crossborder transactions; and (4)
marketing products destined for foreign markets. What is happening here is
extraordinary. It is a wonderful time in which to live and work in this
community. It is tailor-made for a body of professionals such as yourselves.
C. Securitization in Latin America: Real Property,Equipment,
Intangibles, and Other Assets
MODERATOR -

JANA SIGARS:

Horacio Guti6rrez is an international consultant with the firm of Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius in Miami. He received a LL.B. in 1986 and a Specialist
in Commercial Law degree in 1988 from the Universidad Catolica Andres
Bello in Caracas, Venezuela, and an LL.M. in 1991 from Harvard University.
Mr. Guti~rrez is a member of the American, InterAmerican, and Federal
District (Venezuela) Bar Associations.
HORACIO GuTItRREZ-MACHADO:

The first question that we should ask is: "Why are we discussing
securitization of assets?" It is an easy question for people who have
followed the financial markets in Latin America over the last two to three
years. In 1989, total corporate debt issued by Latin American issuers was
only US$297 million. In 1990, it almost doubled to US$552 million, and in
1991, it continued to grow to US$4.4 billion. In 1992, it grew to US$10
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billion, and in 1993, peaked at US$21.8 billion.
Unlike the prior years, 1994 and 1995 were marked by high volatility
and political and economic turmoil in the Latin American region. The
financial crisis in Venezuela in 1994; the Zapatistas' insurgence in Chiapas;
the murder of political leaders and the nuevo peso devaluation in Mexico,
which has had an adverse effect on the economies of other Latin American
countries (the so-called Tequila Effect); the liquidity crisis in the financial
sector in Argentina; and more recently, the political scandals involving the
President of Colombia, among others, have exacerbated the general
perception of risk in connection with Latin American securities as a whole.
As a result, the number of issues, as well as the total amount issued by Latin
American entities, suffered a dramatic decrease during 1994 and 1995.
This is a very long list of events that have occurred in a relatively short
period of time, resulting in a tremendous scare for international investors,
including institutional investors and large investment funds throughout the
world. Unfortunately, they have viewed the situation without a clear
understanding of each country and its particular economy. They basically
have made a blanket judgment and decided that this market, which was so
attractive three years ago, is suddenly no longer attractive. Only blue-chip
companies and triple-A companies that have export operations with access
to hard currency because of exports to Europe or the United States still have
access to traditional debt financing. They have access not only to traditional
banking loans, credit facilities, and trade financing facilities, but also to
international capital markets where they can play their Eurobonds, commercial paper, and other types of debt instruments.
Because of the manner in which the international debt markets for Latin
America have changed over the past years, securitization has, in fact, become
a viable financing alternative through which local companies in Latin
America can access financing. It is the rule rather than the exception.
Securitization is a financing technique that takes place when assets, basically
loans or receivables, are sold by their original owner, known as the
originator. They are sold to an entity established for the sole purpose of
holding these assets, that is, a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which finances
the purchase using the acquired assets as collateral. The financing of the
purchase price of the assets can be accomplished in any number of different
ways, including through a public or private offering of notes or Eurobonds,
or with more traditional credit facilities such as syndicated or straight bank
loans. Basically, the idea of securitization is taking an asset or a portfolio
of assets, which normally would be illiquid in the financial markets like Latin
America where there is no liquidity for mortgage loans, for example, and
transforming it into a negotiable instrument. There is no ready market for
people buying and selling these kinds of assets. You take those liquid assets
and convert them into a paper instrument, which is basically a negotiable
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instrument that can then be placed on the international markets. Or perhaps,
participation can be sold to international financial entities. Consequently, a
market that previously was not there is created by these instruments.
In essence, every securitization has three essential features. First is the
transfer of assets from an originator, which is the company that holds the
assets. A company issuing credit cards would be an example. When the
cardholder uses his card to finance the purchase of goods or services, those
receivables are transferred from the credit card issuer to an SPV. The SPV
might be a trust or a corporate entity, depending on the laws and regulations
Secondly, every
of the company where the originator is located.
securitization has an SPV, which finances the acquisition of the assets. The
SPV is created solely for this purpose. Normally, it does not have capital of
its own to acquire those assets from the originator. Therefore, it uses loans,
traditional one-on-one loans, syndicated facilities, or the issuance of
instruments into international capital markets. The latter option is the most
attractive because it results in the production of a prospectus and placement
under Rule 144A' among the qualified institutional buyers in the United
States or under a section of Regulation S2 when outside of the United States.
The main consequence of this process is the conversion of the assets into
securities, sometimes referred to as asset-backed securities, thereby
transforming illiquid assets into negotiable instruments. As a result, the
investors in the securities look primarily to the cash flow from the assets
backing the securities and not to the originator as the principal source of
payment for the securities. However, the similarities between securitization
structures in different countries and even for different issuers in the same
country end there. I have to make the caveat that there is no such thing as
a typical securitization structure. The design of an actual securitization
largely depends on the nature of the assets to be securitized, the particular
goals of the originator, and the demands of the credit rating agencies and of
the prospective investors.
The structure also is largely dictated by tax, accounting, regulatory and
marketing considerations. For example, tax implications of a transfer of an
asset from the originator to the SPV depend on the tax laws of the particular
country, and whether the transfer is subject to a stamp tax. This is especially
true if the receivables are secured through collateral such as mortgages,
which in Latin America are very formal and require registration and the
payment of registration taxes, value added taxes, sales taxes, taxes applicable
to the issuance of the negotiable instruments, and withholding taxes on the
interest payments made on the instrument.

1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.144A.
2. Id. § 230.901-.904.
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From an economic point of view, the securitization structure is a simple
concept. Implementation might be difficult, however, because it requires a
very thorough understanding of the characteristics of the portfolio being
securitized, in terms of default rates and late payments, for example. Each
securitization is different when it comes to tailoring the transaction to the
particular legal accounting and tax environment of each country.
The parties of a typical securitization are the originator and the SPV,
both mentioned previously, and the investors and the credit enhancers. In
principle, a typical securitization transaction involves an originator, which is
the original lender that initially holds the assets to be securitized in its
balance sheet. The originator sells the assets to either a trust or an SPV or
some other legal characterization. In Colombia, for example, there is a very
thorough and extensive regulation on securitization; it basically is a textbook
on securitization. Colombia is an exception in that sense. There are other
types of legal entities that can be used for purposes of local securitization,
but normally, in the context of an international securitization, it is either a
trust or an SPV. In many countries, the concept of a trust has not evolved.
The trust is a notion that comes from the common law, and Latin American
countries have a civil law tradition, inherited from either the Italian Civil
Code or the French Civil Code, known as the Napoleonic Civil Code.
Therefore, the concept of a trust in many Latin American countries does not
exist. In those cases and others, for a variety of reasons, securitizations are
done using an SPV as a corporate entity. The form of the SPV is basically
motivated by tax and accounting considerations, more than legal ones. It is
necessary to have an entity that has the ability to own assets in its own name
and has legal personality. It should be a legal persona in and of itself,
separate from the originator.
Another party involved in a securitization is the investor. The investor
purchases the securities resulting from the securitization. Financing can be
provided in the form of a loan, granted by an international or a local
financial institution, which in turn can sell participations to other banks,
thereby creating a syndicated facility. Very frequently, the financing is
provided in the form of the placement of negotiable instruments, such as (1)
Eurobonds, (2) commercial paper, or (3) some other type of security that
usually is placed in the international capital markets. Finally, you need credit
enhancers for a securitization. They are entities that produce some kind of
support to provide for cash flow and liquid funds in order to pay the
securities issued. These are needed in case the underlying portfolio for some
reason generates a deficit, or in case there is a problem in the generation of
cash flow for the payment.
Those are the four most important parties to a securitization, although the
reality of the financial world makes it necessary that a structuring agent,
normally an investment bank, participate in the evaluation of the receivables
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portfolio. The structuring agent should be able to thoroughly explain, in the
form of a prospectus, the risks involved to potential investors. Typically, a
servicing agent may be retained. The servicing agent has as its main role the
management and administration of the portfolio of receivables. Sometimes,
one finds that there is a mismatch between the terms and especially the
maturity of the securities issued by the SPV and the average life of the
receivables backing the securities. In the example using the credit card
receivables, in Latin America, the average life of receivables is between 90
days to 120 days. However, in some countries, even by law, the instrument
cannot have a tenure of less than a year. So, there is a mismatch. The
servicing agent collects the interest and principal payments on the
receivables. He then uses part of the funds to create a sinking fund or a
reserve account to generate the cash necessary to make payments of principal
and interest on the securities. Any excess funds over and above that portion
used to create the sinking fund is used to purchase new receivables from the
same originator. Therefore, there is always a portfolio of receivables
generating the interest and principal cash flow needed for future payments.
The servicing agent is a critical part of the securitization structure. It is
common for the servicing agent, that is, the person who receives the
collection and manages the funds activities, to be the same as the originator.
Of course, under a servicing agent agreement that has the proper protection,
it is only normal that the originator, the entity that has had direct contact
with the end obligor or debtor of these receivables and has developed a
relationship, would want to keep issuing credit cards. The originator would
want these individuals to keep using their credit cards, thereby generating
more receivables. This is an arrangement that ends up being very convenient
for the originator, the end debtor that generates the receivables, and for the
investors as a whole. Nobody knows the receivables and the debtors better
than the originators themselves.
In addition, underwriters are involved in order to structure and provide
the financing for the transaction. If a placement, that is, a public proffering
of securities, is involved, an underwriter will set the conditions. Last but not
least, credit rating agencies, such as Standard and Poors, will be involved.
They rate the security to be issued at the end of the structuring of the
transaction. They will allow the originator to dramatically reduce the
financing costs, as compared to traditional financing methods, by giving a
rating that takes into account the assets that are collateralizing these
instruments. The credit rating agencies' role is normally understated. In
addition to giving a rating, they have an active role in determining how the
transaction will look at the end of the day. It is a very intensive process of
negotiation between the arranger, the originator, and the credit rating agency.
During the process, the transaction is shaped in such a way that allows a
certain credit rating to be obtained from the agency so that at the end, the
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originator can benefit from a lower applicable interest rate or a yield that
would have to be offered with the instruments issued. The rating agencies
are a very critical part of this process. There are securitizations that are not
rated because they are very simple and the analysis of the risk is not
complicated. However, in more complicated transactions, the credit rating
agencies play a very important role, and in some countries, like Argentina
and more recently Venezuela and Colombia, they are required participants in
public offerings of securities, either locally or internationally. Sometimes,
two credit agencies are required to give a rating before the paper can be
publicly offered in these countries.
After this first stage, where the portfolio of assets is sold to the SPV, the
flow of funds, which occurs on a periodic basis (monthly, quarterly, or semiannually), depends on the structure of the transaction. The obligors of the
receivables pay the principal and interest to the trust or the SPV. The trust
or the SPV allocates part of the funds to pay the servicing fee to the servicer
and other costs and expenses, which might be required under the structure.
The fees of the trustee are one of the main concerns of the trust when it
receives the funds in addition to the other costs and expenses. These costs
are recurrent throughout the life of the financing, and funds have to be set
aside for these purposes. Other amounts typically paid out are to the
investors as principal or interest payments. The structure can get more
complicated when reserve accounts or escrow accounts also are created.
In a typical securitization in Latin America, the originator sells the
financial assets to the SPV. The SPV obtains the proceeds of the placement
of securities from the investors and uses them to pay the asset purchase price
to the originator. The SPV also reimburses the structuring costs to the
originator, although this is a totally optional feature that may or may not be
built into a securitization structure. Then, throughout the life of the
securitization, the originator pays the receivables to the SPV. The SPV sets
aside reserves that are created normally in hard currency, in the currency that
is required to repay the investors. Typically, in Latin America it would be
dollars. Those dollars earn interest or some other kind of return and are used
to the extent necessary to make the principal and interest payments to the
investors. This is a very frequent structure with certain modifications that
can be made depending on the nature of the receivables. If they have an
average life shorter than the life of the securities that are issued to the
investors, the assets that are sold at the initial securitization, would have to
be again collected, and then the proceeds would have to be used to purchase
new receivables in order to keep the portfolio going and to generate principal
and interest. In this case, this is achieved by creating a mechanism whereby
the originator commits, offers, and grants a commitment to sell new
receivables generated in the future that have the same credit quality and
nature as the original assets.
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The next point is what are the assets - and we have touched on this
point before - that are normally securitized? Securitization is not an old
financing method, although in the United States it has existed since the
creation of the federal agencies that were created to help people to secure
mortgages in order to buy their houses and realize the American Dream.
Since Ginnie Mae and Fanny Mae, primary financers of mortgages that are
then sold on the mortgage markets, were created, a market for securitization
also was created with a view to generating liquid paper, this in turn creates
yet another market. Since then, however, the concept of securitization, not
only in the United States but elsewhere in the world, has been used for the
most unbelievable kinds of receivables. I have been involved in transactions
whereby the proceeds of a lease created under a sell-lease transaction of
aircraft are securitized. Export receivables or even receivables under timeshare arrangements or car loans or boat loans or any kind of asset that meets
the central characteristic - a predictable flow of funds over a relatively easy
to determined period of time - can be securitized. One of the most
important characteristics of the asset is its quality or the likelihood that it will
end up being repaid. For example, in the case of real property securitization
structures, one would want to set a geographic limit regarding what kind of
real estate assets can be securitized. Having a building in one part of Lima
would not be the same as having it in another part of the city. People that
are familiar with Peru would realize that this is the case, in terms of value
and in terms of the risk of actually getting that receivable collected. Second,
the assets must produce a steady and predictable cash flow, although there
is always the risk of prepayment that can mess up the whole financial
matching but there are ways to correct that. There must be attractive interest
rates or returns or yields, so that the paper or instrument that is issued to the
investors also is attractive in the marketplace and even leaves some spread
or room to pay the costs involved in structuring the transaction. The
receivables portfolio must be diversified geographically and in terms of the
number of debtors. With reference to diversification, some countries in Latin
America have limitations as to the percentage of the portfolio that can be
generated by the same originator. In Chile, for example, a limit of 15% of
the total portfolio of assets can be generated by the same originator.
Diversification is important to assure that a collapse in one segment of the
market where the receivables originate is not going to cause a collapse of the
whole system.
Typical securitizable assets in the United States and in Europe consist of
everything. In Latin America the most common have been export
receivables, and the reason is very easy to see - when a company in Latin
America is exporting goods, it has a credit against the importer, which is
denominated in foreign currency. If a company in Brazil is exporting to the
United States, the credit is denominated in dollars; if it is exporting to Japan,
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it is yen, and so forth. Export receivables are the most common assets
securitized in Latin America and have been securitized for years, even before
any country in Latin America even started to think about issuing particular
regulations or laws in the area of securitization, because it was very easy.
If the debtor, the obligor, of this credit is a company outside of the local
country, you can simply use a structure similar to a factoring structure,
whereby the receivable is assigned to a trust that normally also is located
outside of the Latin American country. Therefore, there is almost no
intervention whatsoever of the local regulating authorities in that country.
Many times, I have heard people in the financial area in a particular
country in Latin America say, "No, securitizations are not possible in this
country because the legal framework is not developed." Well, securitization
might be a fancy concept from a mathematical, statistical, and financial point
of view, but from a legal point of view, all that it requires is a legal entity,
which all these countries have in their legislation, and the transfer of the
assets, which can be accomplished by a variety of ways. These include: (1)
a simple "sale" of the assets by the originator to the SPV, which we will call
here "an assignment" of the credit, and which is probably the best way, (2)
a novation, which is the transfer of receivables from the originator to an
SPV, which is the simplest way from a legal point of view, (3) a subrogation,
which is the substitution of one person in place of another with reference to
a lawful claim, demand, or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to
the right of the other in relation to the debt or claim and its rights, remedies,
or securities, or (4) a participation of those credits, which in Latin America,
is not very well developed as a concept and which originates from common
law. Although in some countries, it is contemplated very briefly in their
commercial codes, but otherwise, as long as it does not contradict public
policy, participation is possible because under the party autonomy principle,
which is recognized in all Latin American jurisdictions, all agreements
between the parties, even if not typical, are valid, binding, and enforceable.
So, from a legal point of view, the core aspects of the securitization, that is,
the sale, the setting up of the SPV, and the financing, by which I mean the
granting of a loan, are very typical transactions that exist and have existed
in the legislation of these countries for many, many years.
Why is it so attractive to securitize assets? Why do investors look at a
securitized paper with more complacency than when they look at a typical
Eurobond, promissory note, or other instrument coming from the originator?
First, from the point of view of the investor, a securitization is asset-backed.
In a way, it is a secured lending transaction, in the sense that there are assets
behind the paper that can eventually be foreclosed and assets that can
generate the liquidity necessary to get repayment on the securities. But it has
other characteristics that are interesting for investors, especially sophisticated
investors. In a securitization, when the investor looks at the transaction in
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order to make a credit analysis, it is much simpler to do the credit analysis
of an SPV, which has no other operations but those involved in the
securitization and basically has no other liabilities on all the credit. These
are entities that are structured to be bankruptcy and insolvency remote
entities, that is, entities designed in order to stave off the prospects of
bankruptcy and insolvency. These entities are not going to be messing
around, entering into other kinds of agreements that could result in lawsuits
or a company's being declared bankrupt or insolvent. So, a securitization is
very easy to analyze and is asset-backed; therefore investors like it. Also,
depending on the nature of the receivables, if we are talking about
receivables that are denominated in hard currency and where the debtors are
outside of the Latin American country involved, there is no currency risk,
which is one of the most important risks that have to be tackled by the
arrangers of a securitization program.
Taking into account that this is an asset-backed security, the yield or
return offered by the securitized paper is very attractive when compared to
interest rates charged for other kinds of financing. When these kinds of
instruments are issued, you have a credit rating that is acceptable and a rate
that continues to be very competitive with the rate established for other,
unsecured papers. There is a distortion of the market that occurs when
investors look at Latin America, and even though they realize they have a
secured lending transaction, they are not willing to go all the way and treat
these transactions in terms of their interest rates in the same way that they
treat a secured lending transaction elsewhere in the world. Although the
originator tends to save in terms of financing costs, the savings are not
extraordinary. The investor ends up having an asset-backed paper that is
easy to analyze from a credit point of view and still the interest rates are
very, very attractive.
That is from the point of view of the investors. But what about the
originator? We have discussed that there can be certain savings in terms of
financing costs, but by far, the characteristic that most attracts originators or
companies having the assets or the receivables on their books is the ability
under certain circumstances to structure an off-balance sheet financing. The
originator removes from its balance sheet the assets that are constituted by
the receivables and removes the liabilities and risks associated with such
assets, including currency risk, interest rate risk, and default risk. If you look
at the balance sheet of a credit card company, they have a huge number of
accounts receivable, which are basically their credit or rights against the
cardholders who finance purchases with their cards and have credit lines with
financial institutions. Sometimes, these institutions have very stringent
minimum capital requirements, especially banks, which also are issuers of
receivables or have on the asset side of their balance sheet consumer loans
that normally are securitized. So, the off-balance sheet treatment is definitely
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the icing on the cake, and that is what they are looking for. The removal of
assets from the originator's balance sheet results in increased liquidity
enabling the originator to engage in more business without expanding its
capital base, or to restructure its overall finances to reduce financing costs.
This is why it is so attractive.
It is not easy, though, to obtain the off-balance sheet treatment in Latin
America, and a whole range of accounting and legal considerations have to
be taken into account. The transfer of the assets from the originator to the
SPV has to be considered a true sale, that is, an outright sale of the assets
from the originator to the SPV. If the originator were given a simple
beneficial ownership in the form of a participation, it is very likely that the
transfer would not be considered a true sale, and therefore, the off-balance
sheet feature would not be achieved. This is not essential, and securitizations
have been structured where the originator is not interested in the off-balance
sheet feature. But normally, especially with regard to assets generated by a
financial entity that is an entity subject to all the stringent regulations by the
superintendency of banks and the requirement of placing expensive capital
in the central bank, off-balance sheet financing is very attractive.
Finally, credit enhancement can take many shapes and forms. Credit
enhancements are the rule in Latin American securitizations. Investors want
to have a mechanism to minimize or eliminate the effect on cash flow caused
by a temporary distortion in collections because the late payment or default
rate suddenly grew dramatically. This is not a hypothetical case taken out
of the textbooks, but rather it happens very frequently in Latin America. In
Argentina, the default rate for credit card receivables has been, and I think
continues to be, close to 20% of the whole portfolio of assets. That is a very
significant chunk of the financial assets with which the entities structuring the
securitization have to deal. Credit enhancements tend to generate the
liquidity that may be missing at any one period throughout the duration of
the securitization.
Those who speak and write on securitization often talk about internal and
external credit enhancements. A typical external credit enhancement is a
standby letter of credit issued by a reputable bank, which basically would
stand behind the trust or the SPV and generate the funds necessary to make
payments under the securities. The standard letter of credit does not have to
cover the whole principal amount of the portfolio. Sometimes, it is only for
an amount that meaningfully represents the actual risk. If, for example,
statistically the record of late payment or default of a particular portfolio is
10% or 15%, you might have a standard letter of credit issued for 20% or
25% giving you some cushion, or another amount determined by the parties
involved, particularly, the credit rating agencies, as the reasonable amount
needed to cover not only default and late payment, but also currency risks.
If the receivables are not denominated in hard currencies, such as dollars, but
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in local currency, then something like what happened in Mexico, is
happening in Venezuela, and has happened a hundred times in Argentina and
Peru and Brazil, will result. The devaluation of the currency in which
receivables are denominated can make it more expensive to buy dollars, and
therefore, a larger pool of the local currency and the local receivables will be
needed in order to buy the same amount of dollars to pay the investors if it
is structured as an international securitization. There have been some
experiences with local securitizations where the instruments that were issued
were denominated in local currency, and therefore, the prospects of
securitization were not that favorable. Recently, we have this in Colombia
with securitization of mortgage loans; in Venezuela with credit card
receivables; and even in Brazil with receivables of retail stores.
Another external credit enhancement is a guarantee or recourse that is
kept against the originator. The originator either agrees to repurchase for
cash those receivables that are not performing (defined as receivables that
have been delinquent for a specified number of days), or to substitute the
receivables with other receivables of a like quality in terms of performance
but which do not have a record of nonperformance. Financial guaranty
insurance polices are another kind of external credit enhancement. External
credit enhancements are costly and consequently, used only in structural
financings that are new or perceived as being speculative.
The internal credit enhancements are probably more interesting.
Overcollaterization of an obligation is a typical mechanism that is used as an
internal credit enhancement in order to assure the repayment. Basically, what
is done is that any excess collections on the receivables, which are not
needed to make payment of the interest and principal, are kept in a reserve
account and achieve an overcollaterization of receivables to debt, which
could be 1.5 or 1.75 or 1.25, depending on what kind of ratio is perceived
as necessary given the quality of the receivables and the economic circumstances. The cash flow from the excess collateral offsets any defaults or
delinquencies on the assets.
Other very common structures used as internal credit enhancements are
subordinated structures, where there are two kinds of papers issued by the
SPV: a senior class with first claim on cash flow and a subordinated or
junior class. Normally, the junior paper is kept by the originator or by a
company that is related to the originator. The difference between the two,
apart from the return they offer to the investor is that if there is any default
in the assets being securitized, they are imputed to the junior tranche of the
paper. Therefore, the people holding the senior tranche of the securities have
a performing portfolio that has no experience of default or late payment. So,
those are basically the mechanisms that are typically used in Latin America
for purposes of enhancing the credit and attaining the credit rating necessary
to, in turn, obtain an attractive interest rate.
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The most common legal issues in a securitization in Latin America
involve the transfer of the assets. There are many ways in which a transfer
can be structured. Only some of them will get you to the off-balance sheet
treatment that is sometimes desired. The concept of sale or assignment,
which is called cesi6n de cr6ditos in most of the countries in Latin America,
is probably the most common in the sense that it involves a true sale and
transfer of not only the credits but also of all the risks involved. And if that
happens, the originator can take the receivables off its balance sheet.
Because sales are subject to value-added tax and sales taxes in many
countries, the tax implications of that notion have to be evaluated.
Novation, novaci6n, where the debt and debtor remain, but a new creditor
is substituted, which in this case would be the SPV, also is a way that can
be considered. However, it is not practical for many reasons, one being that
it requires the consent of the debtor and if you are dealing with portfolios of
receivables that are owed by a pool of 1000 or 2000 debtors, there is a
problem in terms of how to obtain it. In addition, sometimes the originator
does not want the debtor to know that the receivables have been transferred
to an SPV. There is a problem of perception, and it can impair their ability
to engage in financing activities in the future.
The subrogation, pago con subrogacitn,is a very clever and a very old
institution in all Latin American countries. It comes from the French law,
and perhaps even from Roman law, and involves an entity paying a credit
obligation of another person where there is an express subrogation of the
credit by the new creditor and that credit is assigned. In most of the
countries, it does not require the consent of the obligor. It has the interesting
feature of allowing the new creditor to obtain all the security and collateral
that was securing the credit initially without having to do any more
paperwork. These are some of the ways in which those transfers are made
in Latin America.
Finally, the last part of this transfer involves the issuing of securities.
There are many regulations in Latin America regarding the public offering
of securities. In South America, all countries, in one way or another, have
capital markets laws and regulations that require the preparation of a
prospectus, complying with certain conditions to actually issue the securities.
In some countries, registration with the local securities exchange commission,
payment of stamp taxes, and registration and a properly structured funding
will get you preferential tax treatment or even total exemption of the
withholding taxes that would otherwise be applicable on interest payments
made to holders outside of these countries.
Securitization is a hot item in the financing world right now and in Latin
America is going through in a majority of the cases. It achieves the
objectives of the companies that need financing in Latin America. They are
not going to stop operating because the Mexican peso was devaluated. They
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need financing to continue to operate and export goods, and in an atmosphere
of aversion toward risk in Latin American, securitization is a method by
which the financing can be put together and allow a company to carry on
with its business.
QUESTION:

When receivables are sold, how does the discount rate differ from the
regular receivables discount rate?
GUTItRREZ:

Discount rates are frequently used in the context of securitizations in
order to obtain from the outset the feature of the overcollaterization. It is not
necessarily used in all transactions. In many of the transactions that I have
seen, the purchase price is equal to the face value, not even the market value,
but the face value of the instruments. The reason it is done that way is that
if the receivables are bought at a discount, you will have some tax consequences.
First, when receivables are bought at a discount, generally, the SPV will
attain a taxable capital gain because it is buying receivables that have a face
value exceeding the actual purchase price paid. The originator, on the other
hand, will generate a tax loss, because it is selling an asset that on its books
shows an amount that corresponds to the face value but which, in reality, is
selling for a price lower than the face value (discount value). However,
financial institutions do not want to show losses in their income statement at
the end of the year when they have to show it to their shareholders.
However, it is done especially with respect to companies that are not in the
financial sector and do not care and actually, would be very happy to have
losses to offset against their taxable income during a particular year. In the
context of the regular banking acceptances or discounts, it has these tax
consequences that everybody must understands before the transaction is done.
In a securitization the discount has to bear some reasonable relationship
with the market value of the receivables so that you do not have undesired
tax consequences. What you are trying to achieve in the securitization is the
overcollateralization feature. So the amount of the discount is not driven by
the value of this receivable on the market but by the overcollaterization ratio
necessary to attain the desired interest rates. I do not think it is driven by the
market. It depends on what you want to achieve, and therefore, I do not
think a fair comparison can be made between the two discount rates.
D.
MODERATOR -

The Emergence of a FactoringMarket

JANA SIGARS:

Our next speaker is Stephen A. Sims who is a senior vice president of
NationsBanc Commercial Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of
NationsBank Corporation. He is responsible for the development of
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NationsBank's factoring group in Latin America. He is currently project
manager for the Strategic Alliance with Factoraje Bancomer in Mexico City
and serves on that board of directors. He has been with NationsBank for
over 13 years. He is originally from Ohio and received his B.A. in
Economics from Ohio Wesleyan University. His Masters in Economics is
from Ohio State University. I think what he has to say in light of the
Tequila Effect and the hemispheric trade growth will be interesting to us all.
STEPHEN A. SIMs:

I would like to give you an idea of how factoring works by reviewing a
definition of the term. I plan to cover what factoring is in the United States,
and specifically, how it relates to various countries in Latin America. I
would like to give you an idea of what we tell the sellers in the United States
when they are getting ready to export to Latin America. I also will attempt
to give you an idea of what we tell the sellers in the United States when they
are getting ready to export to Latin America.
The term "factoring" covers a multitude of sins and has a very broad
definition. For purposes of our discussion, factoring means two things:
ownership of the invoice and control of the invoice. For the major factors,
it also means that we have purchased the invoice on a non-recourse basis.
In other words, the financial ability of the buyer to pay is guaranteed. That
describes what is done by the major factors in the United States. In the
United States, it is about a US$60 billion industry. This figure refers to sales
turnover. This number comes from the National Commercial Financial
Conference, which is an association of commercial finance organizations.
In contrast to many countries of Latin America, in the United States there
is no specific regulatory agency for factoring companies. But, because we
are owned by major banks, we get the benefit of the same regulation as our
parent bank. We have the same standards in our factoring unit as banks.
The difference is that we own the collateral. We actually buy the invoice,
post it in our system, collect the checks in our lockbox, and apply the checks
to the invoice.
The other segment of factoring in the United States includes independent
companies that are much smaller. These companies are normally not owned
by banks. They are owned by individual entrepreneurs. Since they are much
smaller than the major factors, many of them tend to serve boutique markets.
For example, some deal with service industries. There is one in Houston that
deals in oil services. There is a company in Washington, D.C. that deals in
government receivables. There are medical billing factoring companies all
over the United States that deal with a wide variety of medical service
providers. There are some factoring companies that deal in the trucking
industry. I have even heard of one that works with companies that service
900 number organizations. The small factors often serve a market that could
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not be served by normal banking entities.
For the bulk of the factoring companies in the United States, the lending
standards are analogous to those of the banks. Obviously, factors can
redefine risk and take a different type of risk because we have actual
ownership and control of the collateral. But the fees that we charge on the
interest rates are usually comparable with banks. The service fee that we
charge is normally analogous to the cost for credit insurance and the
outsourcing of the credit function. What the larger factors charge is different
from what you have heard about small factoring companies.
Approximately, twelve years ago the companies that we were working
with in the United States as factoring clients and bank customers decided that
in order to expand their markets, they needed to go into foreign countries.
Therefore, we began to work in international factoring through an organization called Factors Chain International. Essentially, this enabled us to
provide credit protection on open-account credit sales to other countries.
This practice originally began in Europe and the Pacific Rim. The Europeans
had been using International Factoring for years, and it was very common for
them. In the United States, however, it was a bit newer; we had to learn the
international business from the ground up. The markets began growing at a
very rapid rate.
About five years ago, my company, which at the time was Citizens and
Southern/Sovran, thought it would be a good idea to go to Mexico and study
the market. Many of our sellers and clients wanted to sell in Mexico.
Shortly thereafter, we were purchased by NCNB, and NationsBank was
formed. Out of this large bank, we were the only factor. Consequently, our
factoring world did not change dramatically except that we acquired more
bank customers who were requesting that we go into Latin America and
specifically into Mexico. The peso crises of December 1994 changed our
direction. Today, instead of selling into Mexico, we find ourselves helping
finance exporters selling from Mexico to our customers in the United States.
I would like to cover several Latin American countries and what they are
doing with factoring. First, all of the importing and exporting done in Latin
America in the factoring business is done in U.S. dollars. This opens up
markets by providing credit protection. Guaranteeing buyer credit makes
foreign currency funding available to companies that otherwise would not
have ready access. It also enables some of the medium and small-sized
companies to obtain credit services so that when they sell in the United
States, they are selling on a level playing field. They can offer open account
credit and do not have to require letters of credit.
Mexico's factoring business is different from the rest of Latin America.
In the 1980s when they nationalized the banks, the working capital loans
began to dry up. Working capital was not readily available to manufacturers.
At that time other entities entered into factoring and used it as a way of
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providing working capital lending to companies that were shipping both
domestically and internationally. The capital requirements in factoring
companies were lower. The leverage could be higher so the ROE was higher
for factors.
Factoring in Mexico is regulated by a separate agency, "the Hacienda."
There also is national association of factors called AMEFAC. They work
closely with the "Hacienda." With the development of these factoring
companies, the techniques for doing cash flow lending and the individuals
who specialized in those techniques tended to migrate into the factors. In the
1990s, the banks and financial entities came together and the factors then
became part of the financial group. As of 1995, the total factoring turnover,
or sales, was about US$17 billion. That is about forty percent lower than in
1994. Due to the peso crisis, 1995 was a very difficult year.
The factoring business there is similar to our profile in the United States.
The volume is concentrated in several of the large factors, such as Bancomer,
Banamex, and Serfin. In 1994, the factors tended to overextend on some of
the seller credits. Since they were doing recourse factoring, the risk was
concentrated on the sellers only. When the crises hit, the factors could not
get paid. Their delinquencies have gone up dramatically. Several of the
factors have been able to take advantage of the government buyback
program, FOBAPROA. This program is helping them get back into step and
get their balance sheets in order.
Recently, international non-recourse factoring has begun to develop more
significance with our partner at Bancomer. There is another factor there
called Banca Quadram. They also are beginning to use factoring to finance
exporters' receivables on a non-recourse basis. As the exports have
increased, the sellers have needed foreign credit protection and a source of
foreign currency. Under this arrangement, when they sell the invoice they
sell it for U.S. dollars. Companies in Mexico that are buying raw materials,
which in our case is primarily fabric, can buy them for dollars and on terms
that give them relief on their pre-export financing. Foreign companies have
found that when they sell in the United States, U.S. companies have an
aversion to issuing letters of credit. Consequently, they would like to buy on
open account credit if at all possible.
A common question is how much does factoring cost for shipments going
both ways. There are two rates: one is the interest rate and the other is a
factoring fee. The latter is a service fee for the credit and collection. The
factoring fee is generally about one and a half percent for shipments in either
direction. As a matter of fact, the one and a half percent is somewhat of a
world rate. Sometimes you can do it for less, depending on the nature of the
invoice and the buyer credit risk. Generally speaking, one and a half percent
is a good guideline.
The interest rate for companies exporting from the United States to
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Mexico is roughly analogous to what they would pay a bank. For the
Mexican companies exporting into the United States, the interest rate is about
twelve to fourteen percent depending on the risk involved in the export. The
program competes very favorably with Bancomer and Comesec. Comesec
being the Mexican export insurance company and Bancomer being a
government export bank. Factoring offers the advantage of having a credit
pipeline already in place. As soon as the seller delivers the invoice to the
factor, the advance is made. There is no waiting period and this tends to be
quicker than government programs.
There are other factors in the United States working in Mexico in
different ways. Some are factoring Mexican exporters directly and have
direct contracts with the Mexican exporter. One difficulty with that lies in
using a lawyer who is used to working in the United States and English
Common Law System, introducing them to a lawyer in Mexico who is used
to the Napoleonic Civil Code System, and then trying to translate. It is
imperative for a U.S. exporter to have a U.S. lawyer who understands
international law.
Next, I would like to discuss Chile. Chile is sophisticated in the way
they handle international credit. The factoring business in Chile is about five
years old. They already have a national association with approximately
seven members. They are primarily involved in doing domestic factoring.
Chile, much like Mexico, has traditionally used factoring as a warehouse for
certain bank loans. They did not enter into the non-recourse type of
factoring when they started.
About ten years ago, Chilean exporters developed open account credit to
U.S. buyers and buyers in other major countries around the world. They did
it to merchandise their credit on their exports. So, they understand open
account trade credit very well. There are two factors in Chile that are
looking into international factoring and both are owned by major banks.
Both have joined the international factoring organization called Factors Chain
International.
In Argentina, factoring is considerably newer. They have two factors
that have opened within the last year. They do not yet have a national
association. Both factoring organizations are looking into domestic and
international factoring. Because Argentina is a country that wants to learn
international factoring quickly, I anticipate that the business will expand
there.
Brazil has a limited amount of domestic factoring as we know it and a
limited amount of international factoring. It is a very large market, but the
factoring industry has yet to be developed. The legal environment is not
particularly conducive as it is very difficult for a factor to get ownership and
control on a non-recourse invoice. There is a small factor in Ecuador. They
too have a limited amount of domestic and international activity.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol11/iss1/2
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International factoring offers Latin American companies a means of
augmenting business done through letters of credit. Factoring is very good
for building relationships because it provides a pipeline or a mechanism by
which an exporter can make frequent, repeat sales to a customer while not
having to generate a new legal document or a new letter of credit. The credit
pipeline is already in place. The exporter makes shipments, which generate
invoices, sells them to the correspondent export factor, and receives cash for
the invoices. International factoring also helps to open up domestic and
international markets that ordinarily might not be open. It provides a
domestic and international source of credit protection and working capital for
a manufacturer. It enables them to increase working capital and buy raw
materials for credit, which can reduce pre-export financing needs.
Finally, international factoring helps small- and medium-sized companies
compete with bigger companies, which have their own credit collection
departments. In fact, some large companies are outsourcing their credit and
collections functions to us because they do not want to be bothered with it.
The organization through which all this takes place is called Factors
Chain International. Factors Chain International has correspondents in over
forty-four countries. There are seventy-five members operating under the
same set of rules and regulations so it is a standardized practice. Exporters
can sell to Germany under the same set of rules and regulations under which
they sell to Japan and the United States. It is similar to the Letter of Credit
UCP 500 regulation. Financial Institutions in Latin America have shown
considerably more interest in factoring over the past two or three years. We
are anticipating that most of the countries that have shown this interest, such
as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and to some degree Colombia, will end up having
the ability to do international factoring.
In order to help our customers enter into international business and
expand their markets, we advise them that when they assume foreign trade
risks, they need to evaluate how large their company's overall appetite is for
risk. They need to add all the risks for domestic business with all the risks
from the international business and then, evaluate what would happen to their
company in the event that problems developed. Unfortunately, many
medium-sized companies do not do this type of assessment.
The next thing we discuss with our customers is when they are dealing
in the international market, they need to be prepared for several differences.
One, their travel expenses are going to be more. Two, the legal expenses are
going to be more complicated and cost more. Three, everything tends to take
more time to complete.
We try to have the importers and exporters do some research on what
they are getting into so that they can discuss it in an organized fashion.
Another aspect is that in international business, and certainly business in
Latin America, the management of the company should be prepared for a
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roller coaster ride. One never knows what is going to happen, but one thing
is certain: something unexpected will happen in at least one of the countries
in Latin America with whom a company is dealing. It is not like dealing
with Ohio and Indiana. Unfortunately, not everyone who attempts to engage
in International business is sufficiently aware of the fact that it is a different
world.
II.

EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL
CONCERNS

A.
MODERATOR -

Resurgence of Mining Operations and Legal Reform
JOSE A. SANTOS:

We are fortunate to have four outstanding speakers to discuss mining
operations and the latest legal reforms in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and
Mexico. The first speaker is Pablo Rueda, who is with the Argentine firm
of Marval, O'Farrell and Mairal. For the past three years, Mr. Rueda has
headed the firm's New York office and is presently assisting foreign mining
companies seeking to invest in Argentina. Argentina's law is fairly new, the
latest reform came with the help of the InterAmerican and the World banks
on the infrastructure side. Our second speaker is Jose Maria Eyzaguirre B.
who is a partner with Claro y Cia in Chile. Mr. Eyzaguirre B. was admitted
to the bar in both Chile and New York. He was formerly an associate with
Sherman and Sterling in New York. He has significant experience in the
mining area, and as is well-known, Chile has had a fairly well developed
mining sector for a number of years. Our third panel member is Antonio
Carlos Goncalves, a partner with Pinheiro Neto-Advogados. He has been in
charge of their office in Brasilia since 1974 when it opened. He has broad
expertise in civil, commercial, economic, and private international areas at
the preventive and litigation levels. He works with the higher courts as well
as with the Federal Supreme Court in Brazil. Mr. Goncalves is experienced
in mining law, including the organization of mining companies, authorization
for developing mining activities, preparation of assignment and transfer of
mining rights, and lease of ore agreements. He also assists financial
institutions such as the Brazilian Financial Appeal Council. Mr. Goncalves
is a member of the Brazilian Bar Association and the Brazilian Mining
He graduated from Sao Paolo Law School of Pontificia
Institute.
Univesidade Cat6lica where he received his Bachelor in Law in 1972 and
from Fundaco Alvares Penteado where he received a Bachelor of Accounting in 1966. Our last speaker is Fausto C. Miranda, a senior partner with
Miranda, Estavillo y Hernandez in Mexico City. The firm works on a
multitude of Latin American legal matters, with a particular emphasis on oil
mining, maritime, and environmental law. Mr. Miranda received his B.A.
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